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Reading between the Lines:
Analyzing the Supreme




Columbia University School of Social Work
Supreme Court decisions can be read on two levels: as prescriptive statements of what
legally can or cannot be done and as discourses that define the Court’s view of social
problems. This article explores this latter role through a content analysis of Court decisions
that directly address the struggle for women’s equality in the workplace during the 1970s.
As it formulated the legal rules applicable to gender discrimination, the Court also gave
social and political meaning to the concept of equality. Examining this process of problem
definition in the judicial arena provides a different perspective for viewing Supreme Court
decisions.
The decade of the 1970s was a seminal period in the modern feminist
movement. As increasing numbers of women entered the workforce,
long-standing stereotypes and perceptions were upended and cultural
images revised. The Supreme Court played an especially active role in
this process as the new feminist movement, like the civil rights move-
ment, frequently brought its grievances to the judicial system (Burstein
1991; Walsh 1998; Ferree and Hess 2000). In Reed v. Reed (404 U.S. 71
[1971]), the Court held for the first time that the Constitution forbids
discrimination against women. With this beginning, the Court laid the
legal foundation through the 1970s for how the Constitution and newly
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enacted laws, such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (U.S. Public Law 88-
38, 77 Stat. 56, codified at 29 U.S.C. 206 [a]) and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (U.S. Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241), were to be construed in
the context of gender discrimination (Goldstein 1989).1
However, the Supreme Court did more than set legal parameters. It
also engaged in a spirited public discourse about the problem of gender
discrimination and the meaning of equality. As Deborah Stone explains,
“causal stories” are created for every social problem to explain the harm
being caused, who is causing it, and the moralities involved (1989, p.
282). These narratives contain assumptions, based on certain cultural
themes and values, about how people should behave. Like public actors
in other venues, the Court also engages in this subjective process of
problem definition. As Theda Skocpol observes, the Court is a “pro-
foundly rhetorical institution . . . affected by moral understandings
deeply embedded in political discourse” (1995, p. 128). In short, while
Court decisions are, of course, about the law, they are also narratives
about cultural norms and values.
Supreme Court decisions can thus be read on two levels. First, they
can be understood prescriptively as statements of what the law says, what
legally can or cannot be done. Legal scholars and lawyers devote much
of their time to understanding the law in this way. Second, the decisions
can be read constructively as discourses that define the parameters of
social problems and contain images and archetypes of groups and in-
dividuals. This way of reading decisions can be especially instructive to
those engaged in or affected by the policy-making process, including
social workers.
This article explores the Court’s constructive role through a content
analysis of cases that directly address the struggle for women’s equality
in the workplace during that crucial decade of the 1970s, when the
Court began weighing in on the issue of gender discrimination. The
outcomes of those cases are well documented in legal and other schol-
arly literature (Goldstein 1989; Otten 1993; Seymour 1997; Ferree and
Hess 2000). Less examined is the second way to read these decisions:
as documents that reveal the judiciary’s view of the social problem of
gender discrimination. I examine how the Court gave social and political
meaning to the notion of equality as it attempted to apply it to a labor
market that included increasing numbers of women, but where many
of the old rules and stereotypes still applied. I look at what role the
Court played in challenging these stereotypes and redrawing women’s
role in society.
Examining these decisions serves a dual purpose. First, it provides a
systematic way of studying the process of problem definition in the
judicial arena, thus enhancing our knowledge of the policy-making pro-
cess. Scholars have long recognized the Supreme Court as a policy-
making institution (Dahl 1957; Casper 1976; McCloskey 1994; Abrams
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1997; Rosenberg 1991). Virtually all of our political, economic, and
social questions turn into legal ones. This power is by design, with the
Constitution reserving for the Court a key and authoritative role in
deciding disputes (Segal and Spaeth 1993; McCloskey 1994). By serving
as a forum for resolving disputes over social issues, the Court’s rulings
take on “a moral dimension that transcends their technological signif-
icance as legal precedents [as various public actors] seek to have the
rule of law reflect their own conception of justice” (Kay 1985, p. 41).
In short, the Court is an important arena for studying not only the
evolution of legal principles but also the process of policy making.
Second, reading between the lines of Supreme Court decisions from
the 1970s can also help us understand this period of immense social
change in the roles and status of women. It provides another way of
looking at the events of this decade, as seen through the eyes of the
Supreme Court justices whose rulings, and the language used to explain
them, helped to shape the public discourse on gender discrimination.
Historical Context
The 1970s was in many ways the heyday of the modern women’s move-
ment. Although the 1960s signified its birth, by the 1970s it had blos-
somed into a powerful and organized movement (Boneparth 1982).
While the early feminists of the 1960s were often ridiculed and isolated
from the political mainstream, by the 1970s their organizations, such
as the National Organization for Women, had become part of the na-
tional political landscape, helping to shape governmental policy (Bone-
parth 1982). With more women in the workplace than out of it (a
historical first), there was also increased attention to women’s issues in
the employment context (Wandersee 1988).
Feminists began the decade with the support of the Democratic and
Republican parties. Both parties backed the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA; Wandersee 1988). Successive presidents, beginning with Kennedy
in 1963, and including Nixon, Ford, and Carter, found it politically
advantageous to appoint various task forces and advisory committees
on women, helping to elevate the concerns of women to the national
level and spurring the passage of progressive legislation (Boneparth
1982; Ferree and Hess 2000). Although relations with women’s groups
were not always smooth (President Carter’s first liaison for women’s
issues was dismissed for criticizing him), Republican and Democrat pres-
idents alike publicly professed support for women’s rights throughout
the 1970s (Boneparth 1982).
During this decade, Congress was also active in pursing an agenda
that incorporated equal rights for women.2 The 1970s saw successive
pieces of legislation designed specifically to help women in such diverse
areas as sports, science, employment, and financial services, to name a
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few. Examples include Title IX of the Civil Rights Act (Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, U.S. Public Law 92-318, 86 Stat. 373,
codified at 20 U.S.C. 1681), prohibiting sex discrimination in any ed-
ucational program that receives federal funds; the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act of 1974 (U.S. Public Law 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521, codified
at 15 U.S.C. 1691), prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions;
and the Science and Engineering Equal Opportunities Act of 1980 (U.S.
Public Law 96-516, 94 Stat. 3010, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1885), designed
to encourage women’s participation in science. The push for women’s
equality spread to even such traditionally male-dominated institutions
as the military. Enlistment quotas for women were lifted, women were
allowed to enlist at the same age as men, and they were granted per-
mission to enter military academies (Freeman 1982).
Organized opposition to the women’s movement surfaced in reaction
to its victories. The success of the Equal Rights Amendment in Congress,
which passed the House and Senate in 1972 with overwhelming major-
ities, sparked an antifeminist movement that helped ultimately to defeat
it in the states (Wandersee 1988). Partisan splits began to appear during
the mid 1970s with the emergence of the new right in the Republican
party, the increasing visibility of such conservative groups as Jerry Fal-
well’s Moral Majority, and an antiabortion movement galvanized by the
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 959 [1973]).
Thus, whereas the decade began with both parties supporting
women’s rights, it ended with the election of a Republican president
who actively solicited support from antifeminists (Ferree and Hess
2000). Likewise, the ERA, viewed as a certain victory in the early 1970s,
faltered and failed to meet the 7-year state ratification deadline in 1979,
as well as an extended deadline in 1982 (Boneparth 1982). Although
progressive legislation, such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(U.S. Public Law 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000), was
passed, such legislation was increasingly met with resistance by the end
of the decade.
The Supreme Court was an active participant throughout the decade,
routinely tackling the issues of gender and discrimination, both in the
personal sphere (including abortion and family law) and the public
sphere of employment. Five out of nine justices were newcomers to the
Court during this decade, including Chief Justice Warren Burger, ap-
pointed in 1969 by President Nixon (Supreme Court 2002). The Burger
Court came on the heels of the Warren Court, perceived by many as
one of the most liberal and activist courts in history (Eskridge 1991;
Yalof 1999). Nixon made three more appointments: Harry Blackmun
in 1970 and William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell in 1972. In 1975,
President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens (Supreme Court 2002).3
The other justices on the Court during this decade included William
Brennan and Stewart Potter, appointed in 1956 and 1958, respectively,
Supreme Court on Gender Discrimination 29
by Eisenhower; Byron White, appointed by Kennedy in 1962; and Thur-
good Marshall, appointed by Johnson in 1967 (Supreme Court 2002).
The longest-serving justice on the Court was William Douglas, appointed
by President Roosevelt in 1939, who left the Court in 1975 and was
replaced by Justice Stevens (Supreme Court 2002). Thus, Republican
appointees predominated on the Court during this decade, first by a
6–3, and then by a 6–2, margin.
However, women’s rights found support among both Democrats and
Republicans, at least in the beginning of the decade. Moreover, as legal
scholars have observed, presidents are often surprised by the ideology
of their appointees (Eskridge 1991; Yalof 1999; Yoo 2000). Thus, con-
clusions concerning the ideological tilt of the Court toward women
cannot be based solely on the fact that it was composed overwhelmingly
of justices appointed by Republican presidents. To be sure, ideology
does play a role in judicial decision making, but its role is much more
complex than simply affixing a partisan label to a particular justice.
Theoretical Framework
How judges make decisions, and whether ideology is a factor, is a subject
of some controversy among scholars. The legal, or positivist, model
assumes that judicial decision making is an objective, rational enterprise.
Past cases, or precedent, determine the outcome of present cases be-
cause the doctrine of stare decisis requires judges to apply established
principles of law to all future cases (Wasby 1988; McCloskey 1994).
Judges are mechanistic in their approach, restrained by rules that pre-
vent their own subjective beliefs and opinions from seeping into their
decisions. Legal education is primarily dominated by this method.
In contrast, legal realists see law not as a static rational set of rules,
but as evolving along with changing social, economic, and political con-
ditions (Kalman 1986).4 They view judicial decision making more dy-
namically, recognizing that the law is but one factor that determines
case outcomes. The Court is viewed primarily as a political institution
that, as described by Robert Dahl, is “inevitably a part of the dominant
national alliance” (1957, p. 293; see also Rosenberg 1991). The values
and ideologies of individual justices also form an integral part of the
deliberative process, affecting its decisions. Laws, precedent, and even
legislative history are open to multiple interpretations, and the subjec-
tive attitudes and beliefs of the justices prevail when choosing an in-
terpretation (Segal and Spaeth 1993).
There is a substantial body of research supporting the impact of ex-
tralegal factors on judicial decision making (Schubert 1965; Gibson
1978; Segal 1984; Segal and Cover 1989; Cross and Tiller 2000; Romero
2000). An example is Segal and Spaeth’s analysis (1993) of Supreme
Court decisions since 1953, which demonstrates that whether a judge
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is liberal or conservative will be a more accurate predictor of case out-
comes than any specific facts or legal principles. Other studies dem-
onstrate that who the litigants are can also affect outcomes. The haves
are more likely to win than the have-nots (Galanter 1974; Wheeler et
al. 1987; Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer 1992). When the government
is a party, it is more likely to win than businesses, who in turn are more
successful than individuals (Songer and Sheehan 1992; Songer 1999).
However, quantitative measurements of outcomes, as used in the
above-cited studies, do not capture the particular ideologies, cultural
beliefs, and other qualitative aspects of a decision, which can be as
central to its outcome as specific legal rules. One way to uncover this
discursive aspect of decisions is to examine its “symbolic or expressive
content” (Sunstein 1996, p. 2023). That content is often easy to spot
because decisions past and present frequently contain unambiguous
expressions of moral understandings and cultural assumptions. The
Court’s view in Bradwell v. Illinois (83 U.S. [16 Wall] 442 [1873]) that
“the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life”
is one such example (p. 444). A more recent example is Bowers v. Hard-
wick (478 U.S. 186 [1986]), where the Court upheld the right of a state
to ban sodomy based on that state’s belief that homosexuality is morally
abhorrent. But such anecdotal examples do not illustrate the complexity
and the regularity with which the Court frames the issues before it in
terms of ideology, values, and cultural assumptions.
To systematically examine this process, I draw on the theoretical con-
struct of social constructionism, which emphasizes the subjective nature
of social problems and the use of language and narratives by public
actors to define a particular social problem (Berger and Luckman 1966;
Spector and Kitsuse [1977] 1987; Rochefort and Cobb 1993; Best 1995;
Loseke 1997). Social conditions are transformed into social problems
and are given shape, as well as meaning, through language. To under-
stand this process, constructionist researchers dissect the language of
the public discourse to reveal underlying themes, moralities, and values
(see, e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Burstein, Bricher, and Ein-
wohner 1995; de Goede 1996; Loseke 1999).
I apply this approach to Supreme Court decisions on gender discrim-
ination, exploring how the Court, like other actors in the public arena,
wove together a mix of facts, images, values, and assumptions about
women to support its definition of equality. Analyzing this aspect of its
decisions adds a different dimension and depth to our understanding
of the extralegal function of the Court and its role as a policy maker,
both generally and in the context of the women’s rights movement.
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Methodology
The study focuses on the early decades of the modern feminist move-
ment, beginning in 1971. In 1971, the Supreme Court decided for the
first time that the Constitution protects women against gender discrim-
ination. Although the new feminist movement first emerged in the
1960s, it was not until 1971 that the Court heard its first case on gender
discrimination. That case was brought by now Justice Ginsberg (Seymour
1997). The study ends in 1982, the date identified by scholars as marking
the transition of the movement from a period of growth and change
to one of defensive retrenchment as a more hostile and politically con-
servative climate took hold (Ferree and Hess 2000). Including the years
1980–82 also permits examination of cases that were brought in the
1970s but, because of the time lag inherent in the appeals process, did
not make their way to the Court until the early 1980s. This time period
marks a period of tremendous social change in which the Court played
a major role, making it a useful and instructive period for study.5
The data for this study include all Supreme Court opinions published
between 1971 and 1982 that explicitly address any issue relating to
women and the workplace, such as terms and conditions of employment
and the amount or availability of benefits, including employer-sponsored
benefits or governmental benefits related to work (e.g., Social Security
benefits). The data also include opinions that are based on the equal
protection or due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution; federal stat-
utory equal opportunity law, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Opinions are also included that involve either
a private employer or a governmental unit as an employer or provider
of work-related benefits or that involve an educational opportunity di-
rectly relevant to employment. Also covered are so-called reverse dis-
crimination cases in which men challenged employers or government
for not providing them or their families with the equivalent benefits
provided to women. These cases are included because they also address
gender roles and expectations in the workplace and because discrimi-
nation against men is linked to discrimination against women.
The total number of Supreme Court cases analyzed is 21. Included
in the analysis are both majority and concurring opinions and dissents.
Content analysis is used to analyze systematically the construction of
ideas about gender discrimination. I use a method adapted from William
Gamson and Andre Modigliani (1989), who set forth a constructionist
approach for analyzing the public discourse in a study they conducted
on the media and nuclear power. They analyze the various ways that
positions were communicated on this issue through “interpretative pack-
ages” or “frames” that set forth the story line and gave meaning to it.
According to Gamson and Modigliani, each package contains an “or-
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ganizing idea” and “signature elements,” or symbols, which act as a
convenient shorthand for describing the problem (see also Best 1995
and Burstein et al. 1995 for a similar approach).
A review of the feminist and legal scholarly literature indicates three
dominant frames in the area of gender discrimination: separate spheres,
equality, and difference theory. Content analysis is used to determine
to what extent the Court relied on these frames, modified, or deviated
from them. The study analyzes the images of men and women that were
used by the Court to support its reliance on a particular frame.6 The
Court’s statements on cultural norms and understandings are also
analyzed.
The first frame, separate spheres, encompasses the idea that women
and men are different and, hence, should be treated differently (Cook
1978). Each occupies a different sphere of life. The men’s sphere is
“the impersonal, public and competitive”; the women’s, the “personal,
private, and charitable” (Matthaei 1982, p. 117). This frame casts biology
as destiny, relegating women to the maternal role and making them less
than men, both physically and mentally. It is this frame that has histor-
ically dominated legal (and social and cultural) thought (Williams
1992). It is reflected in such early Supreme Court decisions as Bradwell
and Muller v. Oregon (208 U.S. 412 [1908]), which upheld restrictions
on the number of hours a woman could work because “her physical
structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence” (p. 421).
The second frame, equality, was formulated in direct response to the
first. This frame emphasizes the “right of each individual to equal treat-
ment based on equal performance” (Freedman 1983, p. 913; see also
Williams 1984, 1992; Kirp, Yudof, and Franks 1986; Bartlett 1993). The
similarities between men and women, rather than differences (biological
or otherwise), are emphasized. This concept of equality had its genesis
in the civil rights movement (Kay 1985). Just as blacks “face no natural
handicaps and possess no natural significant differences than whites”
(Littleton 1987, p. 1289), there are “no significant natural differences
between men and women” (Littleton 1987, p. 1291). Perceived differ-
ences are in fact overbroad generalizations and stereotypes that are not
applicable to individual women. Under this concept of equality, there
may be some instances where women may be treated differently in order
to make up for past discrimination, but only temporarily. Pregnancy,
the one obvious and inescapable difference between men and women,
is viewed as similar to disabilities that may from time to time affect men
and women alike (Williams 1984). This conception of equality empha-
sizes the sameness of men and women, limiting focus on any special
accommodations for gender-related conditions because of the frequency
with which such distinctions had been used against women in the past
(Williams 1984).
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The third frame, difference theory, was formulated by feminist schol-
ars who view the equality framework as too often requiring women to
fit into the norms of the male world (Gilligan 1982; Law 1984; Littleton
1987; Pruitt 1994). According to these feminists, equality theory does
not sufficiently take into account biological differences, such as preg-
nancy, social norms, and social practices, which have disadvantaged
women in the past. Difference theory recognizes biological and cultur-
ally influenced differences but does not view them as the separate
spheres frame does. Women are not to be punished or protected based
on these differences, but neither should they be treated the same as
men (Littleton 1987). Rather, women should be compensated when a
cultural or biological difference has unequal and negative consequences
(Littleton 1987). They should get either special rights based on their
special needs or accommodations that eliminate any advantage for men
(Law 1984). For example, pregnant women should be entitled to work-
related disability benefits, not because pregnancy is similar to other
disabilities, but because it is a burden that falls unequally on women
(Littleton 1987). Those in gender-segregated occupations, such as nurs-
ing and teaching, should be entitled to higher compensation, not be-
cause their jobs are necessarily equivalent to men’s, but because their
low pay is a reflection of the lower esteem in which so-called female
occupations are held in society.
Discussion and Findings
The Supreme Court decided 21 cases involving 23 issues that relate to
gender discrimination in employment between 1971 and 1982. Most of
the cases were brought against governmental agencies that administered
various benefit programs (e.g., Social Security or unemployment insur-
ance benefits) or that ran entities such as schools or prisons. Only five
cases were brought against private employers.
The cases fall into the following three categories: challenges to benefit
programs, pay scales, and promotion and seniority rules; pregnancy-
and maternity-related issues in the workplace; and gender-related ex-
clusions from employment or professional schools. Of the 23 practices
challenged as discriminatory, 16 were invalidated and seven upheld.
Eight of the cases were brought by men claiming discrimination. In all
but three of these cases, the men were successful.
An analysis of the voting records of each justice reveals distinct pat-
terns (see table 1). Some justices routinely voted for outcomes that
advanced the cause of women’s rights, while others did not.7 The
greatest disparity is between Justice Marshall and Justice Rehnquist. Jus-
tice Marshall voted the profeminist position in 22 out of 23 cases. (His
single antifeminist vote was based on the premise that the legislature
had already taken care of the discriminatory practice.) Justice Rehnquist
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Table 1
Supreme Court Cases on Gender Discrimination in Employment (1971–82):
Justices’ Votes
Case DUG POW BRN WHT MAR BRG RHN BLM STW STV Vote
Phillips        9–0
Frontiero          8–1
LaFleur          7–2
Brennan         0 5–3
Aiello          6–3
Ballard          5–4
Wiesenfeld 0         8–0
Turner      0  0  6–3
Gilbert          6–3
Goldfarb          5–4
Webster          9–0
Satty (1)          9–0
Satty (2)          6–3
Dothard (1)          8–1
Dothard (2)          6–3
Manhart  0        6–2
Feeney          7–2
Westcott          9–0
Wengler          8–1
Gunther          5–4
Rostker          6–3
Ford         6–3
Hogan         5–4
% Profeminist 85 63 95 65 95 40 27 59 60 66
Note.— p profeminist;  p antifeminist; 0 p no participation in vote. Symbols
based on a modified version of a scalogram used by Cook (1978). DUG p William Douglas;
POW p Lewis Powell; BRN p William Brennan; WHT p Byron White; MAR p Thurgood
Marshall; BRG p Warren Burger; RHN p William Rehnquist; BLM p Harry Blackmun;
STW p Potter Stewart; STV p John Paul Stevens.
voted the profeminist position in only 27 percent of cases. Chief Justice
Burger has the next lowest rating, at 40 percent. The remaining justices,
with the exception of Douglas, who voted profeminist 85 percent of the
time, are in the 59–65 percent range.
Based on outcomes only, this was a Court that in the aggregate could
be fairly characterized as supportive of women’s rights in the employ-
ment context. It was also a Court characterized, for the most part, by
consensus (see table 1). Only four out of the 23 decisions were decided
by a 5–4 margin. Eight decisions were unanimous or had only one
dissenting vote. The most frequent voting split was 6–3. However, a
textual analysis of the decisions reveals much more complex, nuanced
views on gender discrimination and concepts of equality (see table 2
for a summary of the results as explained below).
Table 2
Supreme Court Cases on Gender Discrimination in Employment (1971–82)
Case Issue Date Vote Frame
Phillips Mothers of preschool children denied
employment
1971  E
Frontiero Spouses of female, but not male, soldiers
must show need for benefits
1973  E
LaFleur Forced maternity leave in school system 1974  E
Brennan Pay scale differential evening/day shift
benefited men
1974  D
Aiello Pregnancy excluded from coverage in
state disability benefits program
1974  S
Ballard Military promotions for women less strin-
gent than for men
1975  E
Wiesenfeld Social Security mother’s benefits denied
to men
1975  E
Turner Unemployment benefits for pregnant
women denied
1975  E
Gilbert Pregnancy excluded from coverage in pri-
vate disability benefits program
1976  S
Goldfarb Widowers, not widows, must show need
for Social Security widow benefits
1977  E
Webster Social Security earnings calculations more
advantageous for women
1977  E
Satty 1) Seniority lost upon return from mater-
nity leave
1977  D
Satty 2) Sick leave cannot be used for mater-
nity leave
1977  S
Dothard 1) Height/weight requirements for cor-
rections officers eliminated women
1977  E
Dothard 2) Contact positions in all male prisons
denied to women
1977  S
Manhart Pension contributions higher for women 1978  E
Feeney Veterans’ preference programs excluded
women from government jobs
1979  S
Westcott AFDC-UF program restricted to men 1979  E
Wengler Widowers, not widows, must show need
for workmen’s compensation benefits
1980  E
Gunther Pay scale for guards in prison system
lower for women
1981  D
Rostker Registration of women for the draft 1981  S
Ford Retroactive seniority denied to successful
Title VII claimants
1982  S
Hogan State nursing school restricted to women 1982  E
Note.— p profeminist;  p antifeminist; S p separate spheres; E p equality; D p
difference theory; AFDC-UF p Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed
Father.
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Equalizing Benefits and Pay Scales
Slightly less than half (47 percent) of the issues brought before the
Court involved work-related benefits, pay scales, and rules regarding
seniority and promotion (referred to collectively as the “benefits cases”).
Three cases addressed programs that made it more difficult for men to
receive benefits by requiring them, and not women, to show need; these
programs included state workmen’s compensation (Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance 1980), Social Security (Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 1975),
and military benefit programs (Frontiero v. Richardson 1973). Thus, for
example, the spouse of a male soldier was entitled to medical and dental
benefits and an increased housing allowance, but spouses of female
soldiers had to show that they were dependent on their wives. Likewise,
widows were automatically entitled to Social Security widow’s benefits
and workmen’s compensation benefits upon the death of their spouses,
but men had to demonstrate that their wives had supported them.
Some benefits were available to only one sex. For example, Social
Security mother’s benefits were available to mothers with young children
whose father had died but not to fathers when the mother died (Califano
v. Goldfarb 1977). Men were entitled to benefits under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program, but
women were not (Califano v. Westcott 1979). In other instances, the
amount of benefits varied according to gender. For example, women
were able to calculate their Social Security benefits differently, and more
liberally, than men (Califano v. Webster 1977). In another case women
were required to contribute more to an employer pension plan than
men (City of Los Angeles v. Manhart 1978).
The remaining cases in this category involved unequal pay scales be-
tween men and women (Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 1974; County of
Washington v. Gunther 1981), promotional requirements that were more
stringent for male soldiers than for female soldiers (Schlesinger v. Ballard
1975), and an employer’s seniority policy regarding women who had
successfully filed discrimination complaints (Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC
1982).
The cases were, with one exception discussed below, resolved by in-
validating the practices as discriminatory. The Court primarily relied on
the equality frame, constructing a notion of equality that emphasizes
the similarities between men and women, as well as the desirability of
affording the same treatment to each.
To construct this narrative of equality, the Court recast traditional
images of women as primarily mothers and men as breadwinners. Thus,
in Brennan, when mostly male night shift inspectors were paid more
than female day shift inspectors for the same work, the Court (citing a
Senate Report) rejected the “ancient and outmoded belief that a man
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because of his role in society should be paid more” and invalidated the
pay scale (p. 195).
Likewise, benefit programs that had originally been enacted as pro-
tective programs for women, such as mother’s benefits, were redefined
along with women’s and men’s roles. Images of the stereotypical home-
maker, who relied on her husband’s earnings and was in dire need if
her husband died, were replaced by those of the working woman, who
was discriminated against because her family did not receive the same
benefits as those of working men if she died. As the Court put it, “the
presumption of complete dependency of wives upon husbands has little
relationship to present reality” (Wiesenfeld, p. 643). Conversely, men were
depicted as caretakers who, if their spouse died, might like the option
to remain at home, caring for their children. Fathers, no less than
mothers, have the right to the “companionship, care, custody and man-
agement of their children” (p. 652). In this way, the Court constructed
a more egalitarian view of the respective roles and relationships of men
and women in society. This markedly deviated from the bifurcated and
traditional view of men as breadwinners and women as homemakers.8
In fashioning its concept of equality in the benefits cases, the Court
demonstrated a certain degree of elasticity, particularly when it was not
so easy to mute the differences between men and women by simply
revising cultural roles. For example, the issue in Manhart involved a
pension plan to which women were required to contribute more than
men because they tend to live longer and, hence, as a group receive
more benefits than men. Here the Court formulated a more nuanced
and individualized version of equality. It invalidated the practice because
each individual woman may not in fact live as long as the statistical
woman. Thus, equality was not only about treating similarly situated
groups the same but also about eschewing group generalizations (even
empirically based ones) and treating people as individuals who are
equally entitled to certain benefits.
The Court also adopted the compensatory aspect of the equality
frame, which recognizes that treating men and women the same does
not always ensure equality, especially where women suffer from a dis-
advantage. Thus, the Court acknowledged in several cases that equal
treatment can lead to unequal outcomes because men and women do
not always start from the same place. The Court’s clearest statement of
this came in a challenge to a Social Security regulation that allowed
women more flexibility than men in choosing which earning years prior
to 1972 to include when calculating benefits (Webster). In upholding the
regulation, which sometimes resulted in higher benefits for women than
men who were born during the same years, the Court underscored the
need for this flexibility because “whether from overt discrimination or
from the socialization process of a male dominated culture, the job
market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paying
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job” (p. 318). Likewise, in Ballard, the Court recognized the pernicious
effects of discrimination in the military, allowing women more time than
men to obtain a promotion before being forcibly discharged for not ob-
taining one.
In Gunther, a pay scale case, the Court took the next steps in the
evolutions of feminist and applied difference theories. The plaintiffs in
Gunther were female prison guards who were paid less than male coun-
terparts. Under the Equal Pay Act, women were to receive equal pay
for equal work. However, because the male and female guards did not
perform equivalent work (men guarded more prisoners while women
did more clerical work), the equal pay for equal work formula was of
no help. The female guards argued that Title VII (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified at 42
U.S.C. 2000e) could be interpreted more broadly than the equal pay
for equal work standard contained in the Equal Pay Act.
The Court upheld this expansive interpretation of Title VII and al-
lowed women to bring claims for discrimination even where they were
doing jobs that were not equivalent to men’s. As the majority in Gunther
noted, the equal pay for equal work formula was of no help to women
in sex-segregated occupations where there were few if any men per-
forming the same work. This would limit Title VII remedies to only
those professions, such as accounting and law, where men could be
found, thus leaving the majority of women without protection.9
Using the difference theory frame, the Court explicitly acknowledged
that culture-based differences result in women’s jobs being less valued
than men’s jobs and that the equality remedy, equal pay for equal work,
does not provide a solution. In so doing, the Court went beyond the
equality remedies in Gunther and Webster that were time limited or de-
signed to remedy specific acts of past discrimination. Consistent with
difference theory, it allowed women to use Title VII in a way that would
compensate them for the negative consequences that fall on women as
a result of culturally and socially created differences.10
The one unsuccessful case in the category of work-related benefits
involved remedies for discrimination. In Ford, after Ford Motor Com-
pany was found in violation of Title VII by refusing to hire women for
certain jobs, the company offered the women jobs but without retro-
active seniority. Since seniority was the key to a whole host of benefits,
including wage levels, promotions, transfers, and protection from lay-
offs, this put women at a distinct disadvantage, especially in relation to
those men who had been hired at the same time the women had been
illegally refused jobs.
Based on the equality frame it had developed in earlier cases, the
Court could have determined that because women did not start at the
same place as men, particularly at Ford, they should be fully compen-
sated, which only retroactive seniority would do. Instead, the Court
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opted to protect the men rather than compensate the women. As the
Court explained, to do otherwise would result in labor unrest, low mo-
rale, and harm to innocent third parties by disrupting the established
seniority hierarchy. Perhaps the presence of a distinct and identifiable
group of men that would be harmed stopped the Court from applying
the equality frame. The decision presages arguments made in later years
by opponents of affirmative action that so-called reverse discrimination
could also be a violation of equality.
As noted above, this was the only instance in this category of cases
when an allegedly discriminatory practice was upheld by the Court. In
the relatively straightforward area of work-related benefits, the Court
reached a consensus that men and women are equally entitled to such
benefits and that, at least in some instances, compensatory and differential
treatment of women is necessary in order to redress past discrimination.
Such a consensus did not always mean that the justices had identical
beliefs on equality or similar views of men’s and women’s roles, as ev-
idenced by some of the differences between majority and concurring
opinions. Not all of the profeminist justices shared the view that men’s
and women’s social roles are interchangeable. The concurring justices
in Wiesenfeld reinforced traditional gender roles by commenting that
they did not think fathers would ultimately end up staying home, even
if granted mother’s benefits. And a concurring justice in Wengler and
Goldfarb, in contrast to the majority opinion, viewed a man’s inability
to collect benefits based on his wife’s work record as discrimination
against men, not women. This, in effect, minimized the majorities’ em-
phasis on women as workers whose families were entitled to the same
benefits as those of working men.
Dissenting justices spoke sparsely on the issue of equality, choosing
either to attack the majority’s decisions on more technical grounds or
not to respond with full dissents. However, when they did directly address
the issue, consistent with the separate spheres frame, it was to emphasize
the differences between men and women and, hence, the appropriate-
ness of having different standards. Difference was emphasized not, as
in difference theory, to compensate women for the unequal conse-
quences of such differences, but to justify different treatment of the
sexes. Thus, because women tend to live longer than men, they could
be required to pay more into a pension plan. Similarly, as the dissent
argued in Goldfarb, because statistics showed that women, and not men,
were more likely to be dependent on a spouse, it was appropriate to
require men, and not women, to show that they had been supported
by their spouse in order to be eligible for widow’s benefits.
Goldfarb also demonstrated the differing and selective use of statistics
by both the majority and dissent to support their respective views. The
majority marshaled statistics to show the number of working women,
thus emphasizing facts that made women more like men (both worked).
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The dissent called on a different set of statistics to show that women
were more likely to be dependent on their husbands than vice versa,
thus emphasizing how women and men were different. The similarity
of men and women proved even more contentious when the justices
addressed workplace issues relating to pregnancy and child rearing.
Pregnancy and Mothering
The most defining difference between men and women, reproductive
capability, came before the Court frequently in this era. Of the 23 issues
that the Court decided, five involved pregnancy and one directly related
to a woman’s role as a mother. These cases included the exclusion of
pregnant women from unemployment programs (Turner v. Utah 1975)
and state and private disability benefit programs (Geduldig v. Aiello 1974;
General Electric v. Gilbert 1976), forced maternity leaves (Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur 1974), and the loss of seniority and sick leave
during maternity leaves (Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 1977). An employer’s
refusal to hire women with preschool-age children was also challenged
(Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 1971).
The outcomes of these cases were not as uniform and consistent as
those of the benefits cases. According to the Court, forced maternity
leave, the denial of unemployment benefits, and the loss of seniority
were wrong. Denying pregnant women disability benefits and pregnancy-
related sick leave were right. In one case, the Court observed that preg-
nancy “imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not
suffer” (Satty, p. 141), while in another case it said “pregnancy [was not]
a sex-based classification” (Gilbert, p. 134). In Phillips, the Court held
that male and female parents must be judged by the same standard,
but conflicting family obligations may be more relevant to job perform-
ance for women than men. Thus, in contrast to the benefits cases, it is
clear that pregnancy and child rearing were conundrums the Court
could not easily resolve.11
Perhaps the simplest pregnancy issue was that posed by LaFleur, where
schoolteachers were forced to go on maternity leave in their fourth
month of pregnancy, regardless of their physical condition. The equality
framework worked well here, especially the variation that emphasizes
the individual over group generalizations. The LaFleur Court empha-
sized the unique way in which each woman experienced pregnancy,
constructing it as primarily an individual issue not amenable to rigid
rules, such as a forced maternity leave date, which applied detrimentally
to all women. By criticizing the school board for having an archaic
attitude toward pregnant women working after pregnancy became vis-
ible, the Court’s decision also attacked taboos against pregnant women
working.
The Court also relied on the equality frame when a state denied
Supreme Court on Gender Discrimination 41
pregnant women unemployment benefits and thereby deemed them
unavailable for employment. Echoing the language of LaFleur, it pointed
out that not all pregnant women were unable to work when pregnant,
thus making the blanket denial of unemployment benefits wrong.
The Court drew on difference theory when, in Satty, women chal-
lenged their loss of seniority upon returning from maternity leave. In
clearly worded difference theory language, the Court noted that preg-
nancy “imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not
suffer” because “of their differing roles in the scheme of human exis-
tence” (Satty, p. 142). The Court directly linked the effect of women’s
different role and employment opportunities, emphasizing how difficult
it would be for women to advance if they lost seniority every time they
took maternity leave. Recognizing a biological difference that had un-
equal and negative consequences for women, the Court ordered a rem-
edy (restoration of seniority) that fit squarely into the framework of
difference theory.12
However, the Court reversed course when it came to disability benefits
and sick leave, also holding in Satty that women cannot use their sick
pay while on maternity leave and in Aiello and Gilbert that women could
be denied disability benefits for pregnancy, even while men were able
to collect for disabilities that affected only them (e.g., prostate disease).
The Court rejected the equality argument that analogizes pregnancy to
other disabilities because the consequences, the inability to work, are
the same. The Court also rejected the idea that because only women
became pregnant, the denial of pregnancy disability benefits was a gen-
der-based classification.13
According to the Court, the distinction was not between women and
men, but between pregnant and nonpregnant individuals (including
women). Pregnancy was considered by the Court as an additional risk,
unique to women. As one noted feminist scholar, Wendy Williams,
commented about the case, this reasoning made men the standard in
the workplace (1984). Since pregnancy is an “extra,” a unique con-
dition not analogous to anything men experience, its impact on
women in the workplace does not have to be considered. Only when
women are like men will they be treated the same. When pregnancy
makes women different, economic penalties inure to them (no disa-
bility coverage) that do not apply to disabled male workers (even those
suffering from gender-related disabilities). In other words, when
women enter the so-called separate sphere of pregnancy, they need
not be accommodated in the workplace, no matter the work-related
consequences.14
The pregnancy disability cases put the Court out of sync with Con-
gress.15 Congress viewed pregnancy disability benefits as an issue of for-
mal equality, as did the dissenting justices in Aiello and Gilbert. It passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, which, using classic equality
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language, mandated that women “affected by childbirth and related
conditions . . . be treated the same as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work.” It was the only time
during this era when one of the Court’s decisions in the area of gender
discrimination was reversed through legislation.
Barriers to Employment
Cases under this category include a challenge to a prison system that
refused to hire women as corrections officers (Dothard v. Rawlinson 1977)
and a veterans preference program in state government that resulted
in the exclusion of women from virtually all of the professional slots
(Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 1979). Men challenged
women’s exclusion from the draft (Rostker v. Goldberg 1981) and their
own exclusion from a state nursing school (Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan 1982).
Hogan, like several of the benefits cases, was brought by a man who
was excluded from a state university nursing program. Like the benefits
cases, the decision relied on the equality frame. The Court, however,
focused primarily on the harm to women, not men. According to the
Court, excluding men perpetuated stereotypes that nursing was a female
profession.16
In Dothard, the Court found it difficult to hew to one standard frame
as it veered from an equality frame to a separate spheres frame when
deciding what role women could play in prisons. When confronted with
a challenge to height and weight requirements that eliminated most
women for employment as corrections officers, the Court used an equal-
ity frame. The Court severed the connection between size and strength,
the relevant component to job performance as a corrections officer,
and invalidated the requirement.
But in the same case, the Court rejected the women’s claim that they
should also be permitted to serve as prison guards in certain all-male
prisons. In the Court’s most overt statement of the separate spheres
theme during this era, the justices invoked the traditional image of
women as seductive sexual objects. It constructed a picture of women
preyed upon by inmates deprived of heterosexual sex, with “a woman’s
relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum security prison
. . . directly reduced by her womanhood” (Dothard, p. 335).17 Thus, this
one case contained two very different images of a woman: one where
she could compete equally with men, even in traditionally male occu-
pations, such as law enforcement, requiring physical characteristics as
part of the selection criteria and a contrary image where she was com-
pletely defined by her own sexuality, unable even to make her own
employment choices.
The Court addressed women’s role in another traditionally all-male
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sphere: the military. During the 1970s, barriers to women’s participation
in the military were falling. The president, the Defense Department,
and all of the chiefs of the armed forces supported drafting women
(although not for combat positions). Congress opposed it. The Court
resolved the issue by siding with Congress. The Court reasoned that
since women were excluded from combat, they were not similarly sit-
uated to men, and hence there was no need to include them in the
draft. The Court framed women’s exclusion from combat as a widely
accepted cultural precept, citing a Senate report stating “the principle
that women should not intentionally and routinely engage in combat
is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people” (Rostker,
p. 77).
It was a cultural precept shared by the dissenting justices. While chas-
tising the majority for stereotyping women, who had an important role
to play in the military and should be drafted, they agreed that excluding
women from combat was appropriate. Rostker, then, reinforced the no-
tion that, equality notwithstanding, women could still not do everything
men could do and, at least for some things, still existed in a separate
sphere.
In another case directed to service in the military, specifically veterans’
preference programs in state government, the Court also relied on the
separate spheres frame, albeit in a less direct way. In Feeney, at issue was
the Massachusetts veterans’ preference program, which was especially
broad even for its time. While other civil service preference systems
rewarded veterans points, Massachusetts gave an absolute preference
(Kerber 1998). Thus women who scored among the top on civil service
tests were routinely and repeatedly passed over for the higher-status
positions in favor of veterans. Only the lower-level positions that tra-
ditionally fell to women were exempt from the veterans’ preference.
This resulted in a two-tiered workforce in state government, with men
occupying higher-status jobs, such as attorneys and accountants, and
women refining the lower-status jobs, such as clerk and secretary, that
traditionally employed women.
The Court upheld the law without overtly relying on a separate sphere
frame; in fact, it said the preferences had nothing to do with women
at all. According to the Court, the law was merely providing opportu-
nities to veterans, not excluding women. Similar to the pregnancy dis-
ability cases, where the distinction was between pregnant women and
nonpregnant people, the difference was not between men and women,
but between veterans and nonveterans (a category that included a sub-
stantial number of men).
The underlying theme of separate spheres became more apparent
when the Court acknowledged that discrimination against women in
the military meant that there were fewer female veterans but that this
fact was irrelevant to Massachusetts’s preference program. Thus, as in
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the pregnancy disability cases, the Court refused to acknowledge a
gender-related link that had a disproportionate and harmful impact
on women in the workplace. In short, pursuing a policy that over-
whelmingly benefited men, it chose to ignore the impact on women,
thus making women less important in the public sphere of work. The
harm to women was recognized by the dissenting justices who saw the
preference program as purposeful discrimination, reflecting and per-
petuating “archaic assumptions about women’s roles” and creating a
gender-based civil service hierarchy that could have easily been fore-
seen (Feeney, p. 891).
Conclusion
The Court actively participated, as did Congress and the executive
branch, in the public discourse on gender discrimination throughout
the 1970s. During this decade, the pace of legislation and court decisions
increased as the various government institutions grappled with the issues
presented by the women’s movement. The Court’s explicit task was to
decide, often in cases of first impression, what legal standard under the
Constitution it should apply to women and to interpret federal laws such
as the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For
legal scholars, the central legal question of the decade was the for-
mulation of a legal standard for gender discrimination cases, specifically,
whether the Court was going to apply strict scrutiny or the rational basis
standard to gender discrimination claims.18
The Courts answered in Craig v. Boren (429 U.S. 190 [1976]) by de-
ciding that gender-related laws would be subject to “intermediate scru-
tiny,” which means that the law in question must serve an important
governmental objective and be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives (Nowak and Rotunda 1995). This article describes the
subtext running beneath this and other legal rules articulated by the
Court. It shows what the justices thought about equality, the roles of
men and women, and the outer limits of change, as they addressed a
host of issues, including benefits, hiring practices, and the consequences
of pregnancy and motherhood in the workplace.
Oscillating between separate spheres, equality, and differences theory
frames, the Court helped redraw the cultural lines. It pushed that line
forward when, particularly in the benefits cases, it used the principles
of equality to redefine the workplace to include working women as a
norm, entitled to be treated as equal to men and to be compensated
for past discrimination.
This theme echoed the definition of equality used by feminists in the
early years of the movement, including now Justice Ginsberg, who
brought the first discrimination cases to the Court (Williams 1984;
Abrams 1997). The Court’s focus on individual characteristics, rather
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than group generalizations when formulating its concept of equality
(e.g., in the maternity leave, pension, and unemployment benefits
cases), echoed larger cultural themes that focus on the protection and
enhancement of individual rights as a basic form of democracy.
When equality proved to have its limits, the Court even ventured into
difference theory, a concept of equality that was viewed by feminist
scholars as the next and necessary step. To be sure, the Court’s use of
this theory was tepid; it applied it in only two cases. But that it appeared
at all is one indication of how nuanced and flexible the justices’ dis-
course could be as they, along with others in the political arena, strug-
gled to define and respond to gender discrimination.
At the same time, the Court also displayed a hesitancy to push the
cultural line too far forward. The hard cases at either end of the equality
spectrum, when women asked to enter the roughest domains of men
(male prisons and the draft) or asked that their most “womanly” char-
acteristic, pregnancy, be accommodated, proved difficult for the Court.
Here the Court’s reasoning was less consistent and clear. In the preg-
nancy disability cases, it proved to be out of step with that of the rest
of the country.19
However, even the separate sphere cases are notable for the absence
of the more overt gender stereotyping that would have characterized
such decisions in the past (with the exception of Dothard and, to a lesser
extent, Rostker). Indeed, the Court appeared to go out of its way in the
pregnancy disability and veterans’ preference cases to state that it was
not treating women differently than men. This led to some convoluted
reasoning, for example, when the Court insisted that even though only
women get pregnant, pregnancy is not a sex-based classification. How-
ever, it is notable that the Court avoids stereotyping the separate spheres,
for the most part. This is an indication of how much the Court both
absorbed and reflected current contemporary mores about gender dis-
crimination and the role of women, even as it sometimes relegated
women to a separate sphere.
The approach used here to understand the Court can be applied
whenever reading Supreme Court decisions. For example, the 1986
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson (106 S.Ct. 2399) rep-
resented a new variation in the Court’s definition of equality. In that
case, the Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of sexual dis-
crimination, framing the issue as one involving the imbalance of power
between men and women.20 This went beyond the previous formulations
of equality and difference theory that are described above. Another very
recent example is Nguyen v. INS (121 S.Ct. 2053), decided in 2001,
involving a federal law that made it easier for a mother than a father
to establish American citizenship for a child born abroad out of wedlock.
In upholding the regulation, the Court relied on its own ideas of men’s
and women’s respective parenting roles. The language of its decision
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reinforced traditional notions of motherhood and stereotypes of fathers
as less likely to develop caring relationships with their children. This
decision can be read as a sign that traditional images of women continue
to play a role in the public discourse.
In sum, because of the Supreme Court’s policy-making role, it is as
important to unravel the moral, social, and political values embedded
in its decisions as it is to understand the Court’s legal pronouncements.
Such a focus can help reveal the often unresolved ideological tensions
and inconsistencies underlying our public debates, while also suggesting
future areas of controversy. As past and more recent Court decisions
indicate, the equality debate is not over; it is not clear whether we are
moving toward a gender-blind society or a more subtle accommodation
of men’s and women’s differences. One task of those engaged in the
public discourse is to respond to competing definitions of a social prob-
lem offered by various actors on the public stage. Reading between the
lines of Supreme Court decisions is a way of mapping out the political,
social, and cultural terrain so that social workers and others engaged
in the policy-making process can fully and effectively engage in the
public discourse.
Appendix
Index of Cases (1971–82)
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
Cleveland v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974)
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)
Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982)
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
Turner v. Utah, 423 U.S. 44 (1975)
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance, 446 U.S. 142 (1980)
Supreme Court on Gender Discrimination 47
References
Abrams, Kathryn. 1997. “The Constitution of Women.” Alabama Law Review 48 (3): 861–84.
Bartlett, Katharine. 1993. Gender and the Law: Theory, Doctrine, and Commentary. New York:
Little Brown.
Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckman. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday.
Best, Joel. 1995. Images of Issues. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter.
Boneparth, Ellen, ed. 1982. Women, Power and Policy. New York: Pergamon.
Burstein, Paul. 1991. “Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for
Equal Employment Opportunity.” American Journal of Sociology 96 (5): 1201–25.
Burstein, Paul, Marie Bricher, and Rachel Einwohner. 1995. “Policy Alternatives and Po-
litical Change: Work, Family and Gender on the Congressional Agenda.” American
Sociological Review 60 (1): 67–83.
Casper, Jonathon. 1976. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” American Po-
litical Science Review 70 (1): 50–63.
Cook, Beverly. 1978. “The Burger Court and Women’s Rights 1971–1977.” Pp. 47–83 in
Women in the Courts, edited by Winifred Hepperle and Laura Crites. Williamsburg,
Va.: National Center for State Courts.
Cross, Frank, and Emerson Tiller. 2000. “The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence.” Southern California Law Re-
view 73 (4): 741–71.
Dahl, Robert. 1957. “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policymaker.” Journal of Public Law 6:279–95.
de Goede, Marieke. 1996. “Ideology in the U.S. Welfare Debate.” Discourse and Society 7
(3): 317–57.
Eskridge, William. 1991. “Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Reneging on History?
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game.” California Law Review 79
(3): 613–84.
Ferree, Myra Marx, and Beth Hess. 2000. Controversy and Coalition: The New Feminist Move-
ment across Four Decades of Change. New York: Routledge.
Frank, Jerome. 1949. Law and the Modern Mind. New York: Coward-McCann.
Freedman, Ann E. 1983. “Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court.” Yale
Law Journal 92 (6): 913–68.
Freeman, Jo. 1982. “Women and Public Policy: An Overview.” Pp. 47–67 in Boneparth,
ed.
———. 1990. “From Protection to Equal Opportunity: The Revolution in Women’s Legal
Status.” Pp. 456–81 in Women, Politics, and Change, edited by Louise A. Tilly and Patricia
Gurin. New York: Russell Sage.
Galanter, Marc. 1974. “Why the ’Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Social Change.” Law and Society Review 9 (1): 95–160.
Gamson, William, and Andre Modigliani. 1989. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on
Nuclear Power.” American Journal of Sociology 95 (1): 1–37.
Gibson, James. 1978. “Judge’s Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive
Model.” American Political Science Review 72 (3): 911–24.
Gilligan. Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Goldstein, Leslie Friedman. 1989. The Constitutional Rights of Women. Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press.
Huckle, Patricia. 1982. “The Womb Factor: Pregnancy Policies and Employment of
Women.” Pp. 144–61 in Boneparth, ed.
Kalman, Laura. 1986. Legal Realism at Yale. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Kay, Herma Hill. 1985. “Models of Equality.” University of Illinois Law Review 85 (1): 39–63.
Kerber, Linda K. 1998. No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies. New York: Farrar, Straus, &
Giroux.
Kirp, David, Mark Yudof, and Marlene Franks. 1986. Gender Justice. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Law, Sylvia. 1984. “Rethinking Sex and the Constitution.” University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 132 (5): 955–1013.
48 Social Service Review
Littleton, Christine. 1987. “Reconstructing Sexual Equality.” California Law Review 75 (4):
1287–1337.
Llewellyn, Karl. 1931. “A Realist Jurisprudence: The Next Step.” Columbia Law Review 30:
431–62.
Loseke, Donileen. 1997. “The Whole Spirit of Modern Philanthropy: The Construction
of the Idea of Charity.” Social Problems 44 (4): 425–44.
———. 1999. Thinking about Social Problems. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter.
MacKinnon, Catharine. 1979. Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimi-
nation. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Matthaei, Julie A. 1982. An Economic History of Women in America. New York: Schocken.
McCloskey, Robert. 1994. The American Supreme Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nowak, John E., and Ronald D. Rotunda. 1995. Constitutional Law. St. Paul, Minn.: West.
Otten, Laura. 1993. Women’s Rights and the Law. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Pruitt, Lisa. 1994. “A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence.” University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Law Journal 16 (2): 183–205.
Rochefort, David, and Roger Cobb. 1993. “Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy
Choice.” Policy Studies Journal 21 (1): 56–71.
Romero, Francine Sanders. 2000. “The Supreme Court and the Protection of Minority
Rights.” Law and Society Review 34 (2): 291–313.
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can the Courts Bring About Social Change?
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schubert, Glendon. 1965. The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court
Justices, 1946–1963. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Segal, Jeffrey. 1984. “Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and
Seizure Cases, 1962–1984.” American Political Science Review 78 (4): 891–900.
Segal, Jeffrey, and Albert Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices.” American Political Science Review 83 (2): 557–65.
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seymour, Stephanie. 1997. “Women as Constitutional Equals: The Burger Court’s Overdue
Evolution.” Tulsa Law Journal 33:23–40.
Sheehan, Reginald, William Mishler, and Donald Songer. 1992. “Ideology, Status, and the
Differential Success of Direct Parties before the Supreme Court.” American Political
Science Review 86 (2): 464–71.
Skocpol, Theda. 1995. Social Policy in the United States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Songer, Donald. 1999. “Do the Haves Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s
Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1925–1988.” Law and Society
Review 33 (4): 811–31.
Songer, Donald R., and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. “Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals.” American Journal of Political
Science 36 (1): 235–58.
Spector, Malcom, and John Kitsuse. (1977) 1987. Constructing Social Problems. Hawthorne,
N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter.
Stone, Deborah. 1989. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political
Science Quarterly 104 (2): 281–300.
Sunstein, Cass. 1996. “Law, Economics, and Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law.”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144 (5): 2021–53.
Supreme Court of the United Sates. 2002. Members of the Supreme Court (1979 to Present).
Available on-line at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/about.html.
Walsh, Amy. 1998. “Ruth Bader Ginsberg: Extending the Constitution.” John Marshall Law
Review 32:197–225.
Wandersee, Winifred D. 1988. On the Move: American Women in the 1970s. Boston: Twayne.
Wasby, Stephen L. 1988. The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System. 3d ed. Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Wheeler, Stanton, Bliss Cartwright, Robert Kagan, and Lawrence Friedman. 1987. “Do the
‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts.” Law and
Society Review 21 (3): 410–45.
Williams, Wendy Webster. 1984. “Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate.” Review of Law and Social Change 13 (2): 325–80.
Supreme Court on Gender Discrimination 49
———. 1992. “The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism.”
Women’s Rights Law Reporter 14 (2–3): 175–93.
Yalof, David Alistair. 1999. Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme
Court Nominees. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Yoo, John C. 2000. “Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process and the Wages
of Judicial Supremacy.” Michigan Law Review 98 (6): 1436–67.
Notes
1. Reed involved a challenge to a state law that gave men preferential treatment as
administrators to an estate when several people, both male and female, were equally
entitled to become administrators. The Court held that the law violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Constitution.
2. Although the 1960s saw the passage of two pieces of legislation crucial to women,
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, these pieces of legislation
were not as feminist centered as might first appear. The Equal Pay Act, which was first
introduced in 1945, took 18 years to pass and was designed to help men as much as
women. Requiring equal pay for women was viewed as a way of protecting men’s jobs,
since it discouraged businesses from hiring women instead of men because they could
pay them less, a practice begun during World War II (Freeman 1990). Similarly, the Civil
Rights Act was not designed primarily for women, but for minorities. The proposal to add
gender discrimination was a tactical decision designed to derail the act. It was met with
derision, was little debated, and to the surprise of many, passed (Freeman 1990).
3. Thus, while many of the justices were new, the Court remained mostly stable through-
out the rest of the decade studied, with the cases being decided by the same cohort of
eight justices. The only significant change was when Justice Stevens replaced Justice Doug-
las in 1975. The first female justice, Sandra Day O’Connor, was appointed in September
of 1981 and took part in two of the cases discussed here, an insufficient number to draw
any conclusions on her impact.
4. The legal realist movement had its origins in the 1920s as various scholars reacted
to a rule-bound and formalistic style of jurisprudence. It challenged the notion that law
and judicial decision making were a rational, neutral enterprise. It attempted to unite
social sciences and law, using the legal system as a way to achieve social justice. Its earliest
proponents were Karl Llewellyn (1931) and Jerome Frank (1949).
5. This method was also chosen rather than the common legal method of studying the
Court according to the term of its chief justice because such terms do not necessarily
correspond to distinctive political and social stages but are a function of when vacancies
occur for the chief justice’s position.
6. Unless otherwise indicated, if both the majority and concurrence in a particular case utilize
substantially the same frame, no distinction is made, and both are referred to either as the
“majority” or “the Court.” When they differ in their approach, the difference is so noted.
7. A vote was considered profeminist if the outcome could be characterized under the
equality frame or the difference theory frame as those terms are defined in the feminist
and legal scholarly literature. In other words, a profeminist outcome was one where the
result required men and women in similar situations to be treated the same, permitted a
remedy for past discrimination against women, or compensated women for the unequal
consequences that result from biological or cultural differences. All other outcomes were
considered antifeminist votes.
8. The Court, at times, sounded like it was delivering a history lesson or sermon on
discrimination. For example, relying on the nonlegal literature, including social science
and historical research and findings of various task forces on the status of women, it
described the long history of discrimination against women in all areas of life, noting that
“throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes” (Frontiero, p.
685). It exhorted society to brush aside “archaic and overbroad stereotypes” (Wiesenfeld,
p. 643) and “myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman’s inability to perform
certain kinds of work” (Manhart, p. 707). It also acknowledged “discrimination in our
educational institutions, in the job market and perhaps most conspicuously, in the political
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arena” (Frontiero, p. 686). It even bemoaned the fact that there were no women justices
on the Supreme Court.
9. In 1973, for example, over half of employed women were in traditionally female
occupations, such as teaching and nursing. Only 14 percent were in professional occu-
pations (Wandersee 1988).
10. The Court’s decision had its limits. The Court stopped short of a general endorse-
ment of the concept of comparable worth. This concept began to gain support in the
1980s and provides that jobs do not have to be equal, but comparable in overall effort,
skills, responsibility, and working conditions (Goldstein 1989).
11. Nor can the outcomes be attributed to the shifting votes of a few justices in a closely
divided Court. Satty was decided by a 9–0 vote; Gilbert by a 6–3 vote.
12. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the Satty decision with the outcome in Ford, the
only other seniority case. The Court did not appear concerned, as it was in Ford, that male
employees would resent the seniority granted to female workers. The distinction may have
been that in Satty, the women had lost actual seniority accrued while working, while in
Ford the seniority would have been granted to them without ever working a day at Ford
(albeit because of discrimination).
13. On a practical level, the sheer cost of pregnancy disability coverage, a fact mentioned
in the majority’s opinion, might have discouraged them from mandating coverage. How-
ever, cost did not appear to influence the outcome in Turner, which required the state to
expend considerable funds to cover pregnant women under state unemployment insur-
ance programs.
14. This outcome stands in sharp contrast to Satty, the seniority case where women’s
difference required compensation because of its unequal consequences in the workplace.
The concurrence in Satty attempted to reconcile it with Gilbert by noting that seniority
rights affected women post pregnancy, after they returned to work. Williams (1984) makes
a similar distinction, explaining the difference in the two rulings by characterizing seniority
as a benefit accumulated before women become pregnant, and hence not an extra benefit
based on pregnancy.
15. The Court’s decision caused an uproar, with some lower courts and state human
rights agencies expressly ignoring the decision. It also bucked a trend by state governments
throughout the 1970s that required employers to include pregnancy in their disability
coverage (Huckle 1982).
16. In an unusual application of the difference theory frame, the dissenting justices
argued in Hogan against admitting men because an all-female environment was often
beneficial to women. Echoing the primary thrust of the difference theory frame, several
of the dissenting justices (among them some of the justices who consistently voted against
women’s rights) argued that women needed a supportive and less sexist learning envi-
ronment to counteract culturally imposed role expectations that had negative conse-
quences for women.
17. This decision provoked a sharp dissent, with the dissenting justices stating that the
majority’s rationale perpetuated “one of the most insidious of the old myths about
women—that women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects” (Dothard, p. 344) and
showed that the “pedestal upon which women have been placed . . . upon closer in-
spection, has been revealed as a cage” (p. 344). It accused the majority of engaging in
romantic paternalism because it prevented women from making their own employment
choices. It should be noted however, that the prison in question was one of the most
“barbaric and inhumane” in Alabama (p. 342), putting it in violation of the Constitution.
This may have contributed to the majority’s decision, although it does not explain the
language of it.
18. Legally, the distinction between strict scrutiny and rational basis is very significant (Nowak
and Rotunda 1995). A law tested against the rational basis standard is easier to uphold, while
one measured against a strict scrutiny standard is more likely to be struck down.
19. See n. 15.
20. This form of equality can be traced to the writings of Catherine MacKinnon (1979),
who argued that neither formal nor substantive equality was sufficient and that inequality
had its genesis in norms of male power. According to MacKinnon, this power was sexually
coercive and routinely and systematically used to subordinate women. As a manifestation
of this power, sexual harassment had to be removed from the workplace for true equality
between men and women to exist.
